The International Competition Network (ICN) celebrates its 20 th birthday in 2020.
Introduction
The debate whether competition on international, intercontinental and global markets requires an international competition policy regime is about 100 years old.
For a long time, solutions were envisioned in the context of international organizations governing the relations of sovereign nations, like the League of Nations or, after the Second World War, the global trading system since the 1990s under the umbrella of the World Trade Organization (WTO) (see with comprehensive references Budzinski 2008a: 134-142; Budzinski 2015: 129-130) . However, the implementation of binding global competition rules or enforcement agencies always failed. Thus, national competition authorities (and international ones like the European Union), which are bound to territorially-defined jurisdictions that cover only a part of the relevant geographic markets, have to deal with companies competing on international and intercontinental scales. Twenty years ago, competition authorities from countries all around the world decided to form an informal cooperative forum in order to facilitate cooperation among competition authorities and create a "soft" process of convergence of competition rules, practices, and enforcement styles: the International Competition Network (ICN) 1 . In the ongoing absence of binding global competition rules and laws, it attempts to coordinate national and supranational competition policies by providing (consensually-derived) best practice recommendations and exercising peer pressure on deviating regimes.
Among the permanent challenges for every competition policy regime, the everchanging phenomenon of market competition provides the most fundamental one. The very thing that competition laws and authorities aim to protect and to provide an institutional framework for is subject to permanent evolution, for instance, through Kerber (2019) provides an excellent summary and comparison of these reports, demonstrating similarities like a need for substantial changes as well as considerable differences with respect to the suggested solutions. Furthermore, virtually every other active competition policy regime is discussing reform needs and options in the face of digitization as well (inter alia, Barreto et al. 2019; Steenbergen et al. 2019 ).
1 I have elsewhere discussed the fundamental pros and cons, success stories and limits of the ICN approach (Budzinski 2004; Budzinski 2008a: 142-148; Budzinski 2015: 130-139) . See about the origin and development of the ICN generally also the chapters in Lugard (2011) . New empirical analyses about the records of the ICN present, inter alia, Abu Karky (2019) and Townley et al. (2019) .
The implications of the considerable changes brought by digitization also affect international competition policy. First, competition on online markets and particularly competition on markets for digitized goods is inherently global and geographically limited only by limits to internet access or geo-blocking strategies by the companies themselves. The business behavior of companies like Alphabet-Google, Facebook (including Instagram and WhatsApp), Amazon, WeChat, Apple, Spotify, and others is notoriously difficult to isolate regarding a certain national territory. Second, market structures on these markets are often narrow on a global scale and, accordingly, international market power by those companies is often higher than in the traditional offline world, inter alia, because of direct and indirect network effects as well as data-based business models (Budzinski & Kuchinke 2020) .
Third, antitrust policies and practices, which used to work quite well to remedy market power and preserve consumer welfare, may now display and cause opposite effects because the nature of consumption has changed (see for instance the striking example discussed by Budzinski et al. 2019) .
As these developments influence the (in-)effectiveness of national competition policies towards international anticompetitive arrangements and behavior, the effects of digitization provide challenges for the ICN in the transition to its third decade as well. This essay aims to discuss how digitization changes the needs for international competition policy from an economic perspective (sections 2-5).
Furthermore, it concludes some implications for the ICN's third decade.
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Cross-border Externalities of National Competition Policies
If the geographical area of competition exceeds the geographical scope of competition rules and policy, the occurrence of cross-border externalities becomes likely even if all competition policy regimes in all jurisdictions would execute their competition policy according to the same law, the same standards, and the same underlying economic theories. Competition policy regimes are most typically inbound-focused in the sense that they address every anticompetitive conduct or arrangement that restricts competition within their borders, i.e., harms domestic (consumer) welfare. This so-called effects doctrine rules that anticompetitive arrangements or conducts are subject to national competition laws whenever they affect domestic markets irrespective of their geographic origin (inter alia, Griffin 1999; Fox 2003; Budzinski 2008a: 32-49, 168-173) . At the same time, anticompetitive effects originating from domestic companies but adversely affecting 'only' markets abroad are usually not subject to national competition laws.
Consequently, each jurisdiction tends to focus only on domestic effects, ignoring possible effects abroad.
Economic theory derives that differences in the economy and market conditions between countries, like for instance an asymmetric allocation of producers and consumers across jurisdictions within a relevant international market or different sizes of domestic (partial) markets, already represent sufficient conditions to generate cross-border negative externalities (Barros & Cabral 1994; Head & Ries 1997; Kaiser & Vosgerau 2000; Neven & Röller 2000; Tay & Willmann 2005; Haucap et al. 2006; Mehra 2011; Choi & Gerlach 2012 , 2013 Beinlich et al. 2020) . Even if there is no difference in laws, standards, and theories, the decisions of national authorities cannot be fully compatible with each other, thus causing frictions in the protection of competition on the supranational markets. Even if national competition authorities act in the best interest of protecting competition, the inbound focus and the accompanying ignorance of effects on competition abroad lead to a reduction of global welfare compared to a situation where the geographic scope of anticompetitive effect and regulating regime were congruent. Note that negative externalities from national competition policy decisions can be both due to underenforcement and over-enforcement, always compared to what would be the optimal decision to the affected country abroad (Beinlich et al. 2017 ).
The problem of cross-border externalities is aggravated when national competition regimes intentionally seek to harm other countries in order to increase their domestic welfare -or, more often, the rents of powerful national lobbies and vested interests.
Strategic competition policy represents a strategy similar to strategic trade policy and belongs to the so-called beggar-my-neighbor policies, seeking to redirect rents from foreign to domestic parties (Fox 2000; Budzinski 2008a: 53-64; De Stefano & Rysman 2010; Motta & Ruta 2012) . In competition policy, the attempt to create so-called 'national champions', i.e. domestic companies with market power on international markets, belongs to such strategies. The policy intention here is that domestic companies may exploit consumers in foreign countries (welfare loss abroad) with the profits ending up 'at home' (domestic welfare gain). A permissive merger control towards domestic mergers accompanied by a strict approach towards mergers between foreign companies would serve such a purpose as would selective non-enforcement of anti-cartel rules towards domestic companies, domestic antitrust exceptions for so-called (and however picked) "key" industries or exempting pure export cartels from an otherwise effective cartel prohibition. According to economic theory, strategic competition policies (like strategic trade policies) decrease world welfare due to (deliberately) causing negative externalities but regularly do not increase overall domestic welfare or the welfare of domestic consumers. Instead, only some domestic parties, i.e. powerful companies or industries, benefit -at the expense of both foreign and domestic consumers. The reasoning underlying strategic competition policy then merely serves the purpose to conceal successful lobbyism activities in an imperfect political decision process (inter alia,
Cross-border externalities from diverging and mutually incompatible decisions of national competition authorities regarding the same case may cause jurisdictional conflicts, in particular (but not only) in the case of strategic competition policy (Campbell & Trebilcock 1993 Neven & Röller 2003; Haucap et al. 2006; Beinlich et al. 2017) . Literature lists an impressive number of jurisdictional conflicts on competition policy issues involving a multitude of countries (inter alia, Klodt 2005: 45-65; Budzinski 2008a: 40-49) . For instance, the European antitrust authorities' challenge of the mergers between the U.S. companies Boeing and McDonnell Douglas (Fox 1998; Kovacic 2001) as well as GE and Honeywell (Reynolds & Ordover 2002; Gerber 2003) caused negative externalities on trade and diplomatic relations between the two jurisdictions.
The ongoing process of digitization implies more international and intercontinental markets as well as broader international markets. Probably, only digital markets where digital goods are traded can become truly global markets because as soon as physical goods are involved, costs of geographic distance play some role (even if they are ordered digitally) and limit the geographic reach of markets. And, at the same time, the decrease and eventual absence of costs of distance limit the scope for truly national or regional markets. It would be a gross over-exaggeration to claim that all markets are going to be digital and global, however, the number of purely digital markets with (almost) global scope is increasing. Moreover, the digital elements of the trade of physical goods facilitate its internationalization as well. Therefore, the likelihood of mutually incompatible decisions because of differences in the economy and market conditions between countries increases and, thus, problems from crossborder externalities caused by national competition policies become more relevant and more pressing. In particular, the asymmetry of the allocation of producers and consumers has increased with the (almost worldwide) dominance of U.S. In summary, the problem of cross-border externalities from national competition policies is likely to significantly increase due to the process of digitization. The ICN has been active in developing best practices for many elements of antitrust procedures and, through this soft and voluntary process of harmonization, seeks to alleviate the burden from multiple procedures. However, since the ICN as a voluntary cooperation network of competition authorities does not have executive power to allocate any given case to one single jurisdiction, the results of these efforts are limited -but still highly valuable. Obviously, the effects of digitization further increase the burden from multiple procedures because of the increase in international and intercontinental business activities. In the absence of more farreaching cooperation towards an international competition policy regime (Fox 2000; Cabral 2003 Cabral , 2005 Cabral , 2017 First 2003; Budzinski 2008a Budzinski , 2015 , the ICN way becomes even more valuable and necessary because of the increase in multiple procedure cases. However, as I argue in section 5, the process of digitization is also likely to increase the diversity of competition policies. Since especially the dealing with databased business models and strategies (Budzinski & Kuchinke 2020 ) also requires new procedures, the soft harmonization process will likely be challenged here. It may be considered, though, that in the absence of powerful agencies vis-à-vis the global digital giants, multiple costs of national procedures may recapture some of the deterrence effect lost by the asymmetry of power.
Notwithstanding, altogether the problem of the costs for companies and taxpayers from multiple procedures can be expected to aggravate with the ongoing digitization of the economy.
Loopholes in the Protection of Competition
Protecting competition requires an effective competition policy regime. While -also thanks to the activities of the ICN -more and more countries (but not all) possess competition laws and enforcement agencies nowadays, not all of these regimes are effective and sufficiently powerful. In theory, the inbound-focused effects doctrine allows every country to protect competition in its domestic markets as well as within its part of international markets. However, whether a national competition authority is also able to effectively enforce its competition law against global player companies from abroad, depends on several factors: (i) a national competition policy regime must exist, (ii) the national competition authorities must be workable (and not just paper tigers), and (iii) the relevance of the domestic markets must be high enough to make international companies comply with rulings of the national competition authorities. Ultimately, domestic enforcement power against antitrust violations from abroad relies on the power to restrain access to domestic markets, be it by monetary sanctions on domestic turnovers or be it by prohibiting domestic sales. Thus, when facing rulings or sanctions by a national competition authority, any international company must weigh the importance of that national market for its business with the costs of complying with the national (antitrust) laws. In tendency, comparatively wealthy industrialized countries enjoy a lot of power to enforce their competition laws, whereas comparatively poorer developing countries struggle (Gal 2009 The ICN is contributing to the reduction of such loopholes through its activities to empower smaller competition policy regimes and increase their effectiveness. In the course of the process of digitization, more powerful (American, Chinese, etc.) companies confront smaller regimes and it will be interesting to witness whether these -with the help of the ICN -empowered and better eqipped regimes of smaller and poorer countries will be able to enforce their antitrust laws against internet giants. However, there is reason for skepticism. As far as we can observe by now, the digital economy seems to go along with a shift in the type of anticompetitive conduct. Digital companies do not seem to engage in cartels as much as traditional industries -so far, at least. Mergers are an issue but often it is about so-called killer acquisitions of potential future competitors (i.e. taking upcoming mavericks off the market) and not so often mega-mergers among equals. The most relevant type of antitrust violation relevant for the digital economy, however, appears to be abuse of market power. Due to direct and indirect network effects, market power positions are more likely to surface in the digital economy and the decrease of the costs of geography (i.e. costs of distance) implies that powerful positions are often international in nature. 2 Consequently, smaller competition policy regimes will be confronted more often with particularly powerful companies (enjoying strong market power with an almost global reach). Unfortunately, strategies abusing market power represent the area of competition policy, where umbrella effects often do not occur because a certain practice (e.g. access or use of personalized data, forced bundling and tying, or some types of remedies against an artificial blocking of compatibility) may be prohibited in one country but still be executed in another.
A new type of enforcement problems, generating new loopholes, may be the availability and costs of data-and information-technology-related specialists.
Notoriously, companies are willing and/or able to pay experts at considerably higher salaries than competition authorities. Already sophisticated economic expertise proves to be (sometimes too) expensive for smaller and developing jurisdictions (Budzinski & Beigi 2015) and the market for data specialists is considerably scarcer.
Therefore, the process of digitization is likely to aggravate already existing expertknowledge-financing problems of authorities and due to a lack of availability of top specialists, even the ICN procedures may find it difficult to provide help (in terms of best practice recommendations). In summary, problems of loopholes for internationally powerful companies with respect to smaller and poorer competition policy regime are likely to increase through digitization.
Diversity of Societies and Economics
Real-world competition regimes differ not only with respect to their economy and market structures (section 2), their intentions (section 2), their procedures (section 3), and their power towards multinational companies (section 4). They also (i) pursue different goals and standards and (ii) apply different economic theories, concepts and methods. Firstly, different countries and societies want their competition policy to achieve different goals and measure pro-and anticompetitiveness of arrangements and conduct according to different standards. Even though economic science points to welfare as the preferable ultimate goal of competition policy and is predominantly skeptical about adding other goals, democratic societies entail the right to trade some degree of efficiency or (economic-material) welfare against goals they view to be more important (like market integration, economic development, Secondly, there is no and there cannot be a consensus on a unifying theory of competition within economics (Budzinski 2008b) . This is particularly true with respect to both the evolution of science (theory innovation and development) and the dynamics of the phenomenon, market competition, itself: companies innovate on pro-as well as on anticompetitive behavior. Therefore, different competition policy regimes will legitimately base their theories of competitive harm on diverging economic approaches -probably not always but at least in some of the cases.
Consequently, the dividing line between procompetitive and anticompetitive arrangements and conduct will not be exactly the same in each jurisdiction. The same is true for investigational and analytical methods, which also change in line with scientific evolution and market dynamics.
Altogether, the diversity of societies and economics justifies some diversity of competition policy regimes. There is no one-size-fits-all model for each country and jurisdiction and for all times. This limits the scope for reducing the problems discussed in section 2 and 3. 3 Moreover, it points to a benefit of having some diversity, even in terms of welfare. If several competition regimes experiment with different theories and methods, then this offers scope for dynamic institutional learning. In case of diversity, competition regimes learn from their own successes and failures and, additionally, they learn from other regimes' successes and failures -and, therefore, from more cases in any given frame of time. This mutual learning speeds up the learning process, offers potential to dynamically improve competition policy, and thus increases welfare (Kerber & Budzinski 2003 , 2004 . This is particularly true if there is no ultimate academic consensus and if new ideas, concepts, solutions need to be injected into the policy process in the course of time. However, these fundamental benefits of a system with decentralized elements do not imply that the same case must be exposed to multiple procedures and conflicting decisions. Instead, sophisticated lead-jurisdiction models offer scope for combining welfare benefits of competition policy coordination with welfare gains from mutual institutional learning and diversity (Campbell & Trebilcock 1993 Trebilcock & Iacobucci 2004; Budzinski 2008a Budzinski , 2009 Budzinski , 2018 .
Throughout its first two decades, the ICN has employed its best practice approach to contribute to less diverging interpretations of goals, concepts and theories among competition authorities. This was particularly done by aiming to develop a common competition culture among the participating antitrust agencies and by developing and suggesting informal standards for the use of economic theories and methods in competition policy proceedings.
Goals, theories and methods of competition policy are particularly affected by the process of digitization. With respect to goals, the digital economy leads to a stronger amalgamation between consumer welfare pursued by competition policy and consumer welfare pursued by consumer protection policy (inter alia, Bhattacharya & Buiten 2018; Buiten 2018) . The German Facebook case represents a striking example:
the With respect to the diversity issue, the process of digitization entails pros and cons.
On the pro side, the diversity of competition policy regimes allows for a process of experimenting for adequate rules for competition in a digitized world. Different concepts and methods can be applied and mutual learning, which is particularly on few global player companies. Third, the economics of digital platforms and databased competition strategies partly differ from traditional standard economics and are still being developed in the academic world. Consequently, the previous convergence of competition policy practices across jurisdictions tends to shift towards a process of divergence with respect of how to deal with innovative proand anticompetitive conduct in the digital world. Altogether, digitization challenges international competition policy by an increase of externalities and jurisdictional conflicts, increasing costs from multiple procedures, more loopholes, and generally diverging regimes. In particular, if these developments are accompanied by a revival of strategic competition policies, the current "system" of national competition policy regimes dealing with international and intercontinental business behavior may face tough times. On the other hand, only a decentralized system of competition policies offers the necessary openness and flexibility to deal with the underlying dynamics of the markets themselves as well as of the academic knowledge about the digital economy.
Thus, the process of digitization is already challenging and will further challenge the role of the ICN in its third decade. Its fundamental approach to identify best practices and create a soft harmonization process by peer pressure towards adapting the published (and consensually agreed upon) best practices rests on experience with the targeted industries and the surfacing pro-and anticompetitive strategies and arrangements. However, the novel character of business models and strategies -proand anticompetitive ones -in the digital economy implies that best practices are not yet found. As a consequence, the ICN needs to move forward from focusing on comparing existent policies towards developing and pondering new solutions. And it is already starting to embrace such approaches on its way into its third decade. It will be interesting to see how the ICN will be able to withstand the uprising of uncooperative and strategic policy approaches that quickly may include strategic competition policies.
Still, while the ICN approach is definitely superior to an uncoordinated approach, scientific insight from economics favor an enhanced integration of competition policy regimes vis-á-vis the increasing international and intercontinental character of competition. Concepts for reducing the (welfare) costs of multiple and conflicting proceedings and decisions as well as for closing loopholes without jeopardizing a beneficial diversity and openness have been proposed (Trebilcock & Iacobucci 2004; Budzinski 2008a Budzinski , 2009 Budzinski , 2018 . However, it remains unclear whether a window of opportunity to move towards such scenarios will emerge during the ICN's third decade and whether the ICN, in such a case, can play the role of a facilitator towards more enhanced and more binding forms of cooperation.
